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Abstract
The paper presents a model of two countries competing for the inter-
national pool of talented students from the rest of the world. To relax
tuition-fee competition, countries diﬀerentiate their education systems in
equilibrium. While one country oﬀers high education quality at high charges
for students – the most talented ones study in this country – the other
one provides lower quality and charges lower tuition fees. The regional
quality-diﬀerentiation increases with the size of the international pool of
talents, with the stay rate of foreign students in the host countries upon
graduation and with the degree of development of the sending countries of
foreign students. Compared to the welfare-maximizing education-policy, the
decentralized solution is likely to imply an ineﬃcient allocation of foreign stu-
dents to the two host countries, as well as an ineﬃcient quality diﬀerentiation.
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1 Introduction
The ongoing internationalization of higher education implies a signiﬁcant challenge
for national education policies within the OECD-area. The number of international
students (i.e., students enrolled abroad) has grown considerably over the last thirty
years and growth has been accelerated especially over the last couple of years. Since
the year 2000, the number of foreign students within OECD countries has increased
by more than 50 percent. The four top-destinations, namely the U.S., the UK, Ger-
many and France host about half of the entire international student body. Besides
Korea and Japan, France and Germany are also the largest sending countries. Over-
all, Asia is by far the largest sending region of origin of foreign students. Apart from
students from OECD members Korea and Japan, especially students from China and
India largely contribute to the group of international students. With 15.4 (China)
and 5.4 percent (India), they represent the largest group of students from OECD
partner countries enrolled within the OECD.1
The present paper analyzes an oligopolistic competition under quality diﬀerenti-
ation with two developed (OECD) countries competing for a pool of students from
‘the rest of the world (ROW)’, by which we especially mean less developed (non-
OECD) countries. The two host countries can choose education quality and tuition
fees to maximize the rent from educating foreign students. In equilibrium, they
are demonstrated to diﬀerentiate education qualities in order to relax tuition-fee
competition. The regional quality diﬀerentiation increases with the size of the inter-
national pool of talents, with the stay rate of foreign students in the host countries
upon graduation and with the degree of development of the sending region of foreign
students. A brief welfare analysis shows that the allocation of students to the two
host countries and the regional quality diﬀerentiation are probably ineﬃcient. The
cost of providing education quality plays an important role for the welfare analysis.
In principle, a country might be interested in attracting students from abroad
for example in order to overcome national bottlenecks in ﬁnding qualiﬁed students,
raise additional tuition-fee revenue, beneﬁt from research output by foreign graduate
1See OECD (2008, ch. C3).
1students or positive spillovers from foreign to domestic students, to the university
or to the society as a whole.2 Furthermore, given that part of foreign students stay
on in their host country as graduates (see e.g., Lowell, Bump and Martin, 2007;
Rosenzweig, 2006; Dreher and Poutvaara; 2005; Finn, 2003), the acquisition of stu-
dents represents a strategy to attract high-skilled human capital. The fact that
several OECD countries actually take measures to promote foreign students’ na-
tional labor-market access upon graduation (see e.g., Tremblay, 2005; Chaloﬀ and
Lemaitre, 2009), indicates that countries are aware of this option. Within the model,
the positive eﬀect of students staying on in the host country as graduates is repre-
sented by income-tax revenue. Immigration policy is exogenous.
The analysis contributes to the literature on local public-education policy with
student mobility. In a ﬁscal-competition setting, Del Rey (2001) ﬁnds that coun-
tries tend to underinvest in public education if foreign students can free-ride the
local education system, especially as they are all assumed to return to their coun-
try of origin upon graduation and therefore do not pay any income taxes in the
host country. Buettner and Schwager (2004) state that positive external eﬀects on
non-resident students may cause local underprovision if policy makers only consider
native students’ utility when deciding on education quality. This underinvestment
justiﬁes a tuition fee which is set on the federal level and which eﬀectively raises
the incentive to provide quality in order to attract students who pay these fees.
A contribution coming closer to our model is presented by Boadway, Marceau and
Marchand (1996). They analyze the competition of two private schools with qual-
ity investments and tuition fees. In a symmetric equilibrium, these institutions may
spend an ineﬃciently large amount of resources in order to attract students. While
we also consider competition both in prices (i.e., tuition fees) and quality, our focus
is on public higher education, implying that decision makers (i.e., politicians, gov-
ernments) also account, for example, for expected beneﬁts in the form of income-tax
revenue from graduates staying on in the host country upon graduation.
An important diﬀerence between the present approach and the studies mentioned
so far, is that the two countries in our model compete for students from a third coun-
try (ROW). If ROW students do not have any ex ante country-speciﬁc preferences
for one of the potential host countries and if both countries are exactly identical,
students actually have to be regarded as perfectly mobile when it comes to their
decision on the location of education. They will then only consider regional quality
diﬀerences and tuition-fee diﬀerences. As a consequence, a symmetric equilibrium
2See for example Throsby (1991, 1998) for some cost-beneﬁt considerations in the context of
foreign student enrollment.
2will ﬁnally not exist. One country provides higher quality and charges higher tuition
fees than the other country, thereby also attracting the most talented students. The
reason is that quality diﬀerentiation eﬀectively prevents ﬁerce tuition-fee competi-
tion for the perfectly mobile pool of international students. The diﬀerentiation is
in some analogy to Kemnitz’s (2007) ﬁnding of diﬀerentiated teaching qualities and
tuition fees in the context of competition among autonomous universities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model and analyzes
host countries’ competition in an oligopolistic model under quality diﬀerentiation.
This section also presents the comparative statics. Section 3 presents the welfare-
maximizing solution and evaluates the decentralized equilibrium accordingly. Section
4 brieﬂy discusses some implications of the results for the sending countries of foreign
students. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Basic setting
This section sets the stage for the analysis of the competition of two host countries
for foreign students in a duopoly model with vertical product diﬀerentiation, i.e.
diﬀerentiation of the quality of education. On the demand side it presents foreign
students’ preferences and migration decisions, and on the supply side it presents
host countries’ objectives.
The market size, or rather total demand from ROW for one of two (ex ante identi-
cal) developed host countries of education is exogenous and denoted by N. Students
from this ‘pool of international talents’ are heterogenous with respect to ability, de-
noted by a, which is uniformly distributed over the unit interval and which captures
an individual’s capacity to exploit education quality. Students allocate themselves
to the host countries, such that their expected net beneﬁt from studying abroad
is maximized. Thereby, they consider expected net labor-income as skilled workers
in the future and tuition fees for higher education. Net labor-income is returns to
education abroad net of income taxes. The return to education in one of the devel-
oped countries consists of some base salary w and an education premium aqi ≥ 0,
where qi ≥ 0 is quality of education in country i and a ∈ [0,1] is individual talent
to acquire human capital. Talent and university quality are complementary in the
production of the education premium. Labor income is taxed at rate τ ∈ [0,1] in
countries 1 and 2 and at rate τROW ∈ [0,1] in ROW.
3Although labor incomes in the western countries possibly exceed those in ROW,
there are usually non-economic reasons for foreign students to return to their home
countries as graduates. These are represented by an exogenous repatriation rate
(1 − p), with p ∈ [0,1] as a graduate’s stay rate in the host country (which is the
probability that a foreign student stays on upon graduation). Repatriation motives
are for example failure of social integration in the host country, private (e.g., family)
issues in the country of origin, homesickness, problems with regard to the change of
status from student to permanent immigrant in the host country, or labor market
frictions.3 Repatriates earn a fraction γ ∈ [0,1] of western labor income in their
home countries. At the student migration stage, individuals already anticipate that
they will stay on in the host country only with probability p, however information on
whether they belong to the group of repatriates is only revealed after graduation.4
Expected net labor-income of a graduate with ability a then is
E{wa} = %(w + aqi), % := p(1 − τ) + (1 − p)(1 − τROW)γ.
As ROW is supposed to be a developing region, the ROW net-income of a graduate
from a university in one of the host countries never exceeds this graduate’s net-
income when staying on in one of the (developed) countries:
Assumption 1 (1 − τ) − (1 − τROW)γ ≥ 0.
A student’s choice of the location of education is determined by expected income,
given the quality levels of the education systems in both countries and tuition fees
(denoted by ti). We do not restrict tuition fees to be positive, but perceive ti as a
3See for example Baruch, Budhwar and Khatri (2007) for a questionnaire survey on return/non-
return determinants of foreign students in the U.S. and the UK.
4We ignore the possibility that a foreign-born graduate leaves the host country of education
in order to work in the other developed country. There are good reasons to believe that this is
not too restrictive: (i) spending several years within the host country usually means that people
have built up some social- (maybe even family-) ties and therefore have some attachment to the
country; furthermore, foreign students are usually (at least to some extent) integrated in the local
society of the host country, while they would have to start the integration process anew in the
other country (which can be quite demanding, especially the larger the cultural diﬀerence between
the host country and the new location of residence); (ii) the graduate can be integrated in the
host country’s labor market much more easily, because he is familiar with the country’s culture
(including its language) and has acquired some country-speciﬁc human capital; in addition, the
host country might facilitate visas/work-permits if the applicant has successfully graduated from
a domestic university (e.g., Germany allows foreign graduates from a German university to stay
on in the country for one year in order to ﬁnd a job and exempts applicants from the labor-market
test; see Chaloﬀ and Lemaitre, 2009, for similar procedures in other OECD countries).
4net measure of tuition fees and subsidies per student. The student who is exactly
indiﬀerent between studying in one of the host countries has ability ˆ a, which is
determined by
%(w + ˆ aq1) − t1 = %(w + ˆ aq2) − t2 ⇔ ˆ a =
t2 − t1
%∆q
, (1)
where ∆q = q2 − q1 ≥ 0 denotes the regional quality diﬀerential. Whenever we
consider diﬀerentiated higher-education systems, we refer to country 2 as the high-
quality country. Highly talented students (i.e., those with a ≥ ˆ a) go for high-quality
education in country 2, while all others allocate to region 1.5
The number of students in the low(er)-quality country 1 then is
N1 = N ×

   
   
ˆ a if ˆ a ∈ [0,1],
1 if ˆ a > 1,
0 if ˆ a < 0,
(2)
where N is the total size of the pool of talents. The number of students in country
2 is N2 = N − N1.
For identical quality levels in both countries, i.e. ∆q = 0, the size of the foreign
student body in each country can no longer be determined by indiﬀerence condition
(1). As students do not have any country-speciﬁc preferences, for equal qualities, all
students would study in the country with lower tuition fees. If both countries oﬀer
identical education qualities and tuition fees, students allocate themselves randomly
in a way that both countries end up with an overall number of foreign students of
N/2 and face equal demand from all ability types in the distribution of talents. I.e.
for ∆q = 0,
Ni|∆q=0 =

   
   
0 if ti > tj,
N/2 if ti = tj,
N if ti < tj.
(3)
Host country governments are maximizing net beneﬁts or rather rents from oﬀer-
ing an international study program. On the beneﬁt side, foreign students pay tuition
5The migration model relies on some implicit assumptions: (i) ex ante, foreign students do not
have any ‘attachment’ to one of the two regions (e.g., in the sense of country-speciﬁc preferences,
existing social networks, language and geographical/cultural distance); (ii) all students in the pool
of talents can aﬀord paying tuition fees when studying abroad (either because there are no credit
constraints or because their initial endowment is suﬃciently large); (iii) studying abroad is always
preferred to studying/working in the country of origin.
5fees and students who stay on in the country of education as graduates generate tax
revenue (income is proportionally taxed at rate τ). On the cost side, there are vari-
able costs (i.e., costs of providing quality per student) c(qi) = αqi, α ∈ [0,1], and
ﬁx costs, which are represented by a continuous function F(qi) with ∂F/∂qi > 0,
∂2F/∂q2
i > 0 and F(0) = 0.
If education systems are diﬀerentiated, the objective function of government 1
reads
R1 = τW1 + N1[t1 − c(q1)] − F(q1), (4)
where the wage sum or rather the (foreign-born) tax base is
W1 = pN
Z ˆ a
0
(w + aq1)da = pN1

w +
1
2
(t2 − t1)
%∆q
q1

,
so that the rent from educating foreign students can be decomposed into a variable
part which depends on the number of students and into ﬁx costs:
R1 = N1

pτw +
pτ
2
(t2 − t1)
%∆q
q1 + t1 − c(q1)

− F(q1). (5)
The product pτ basically represents a country’s eﬀective rate of return to a marginal
increase in foreign students’ incomes. Analogously, the objective function in country
2 is
R2 = N2

pτw +
pτ
2

1 +
t2 − t1
%∆q

q2 + t2 − c(q2)

− F(q2), (6)
where we used
W2 = pN
Z 1
ˆ a
(w + aq2)da = pN2

w +
1
2

1 +
t2 − t1
%∆q

q2

.
2.2 Quality and tuition fee competition
The two host countries engage in a two-stage Nash-type competition. At the ﬁrst
stage, both regions simultaneously choose quality levels qi, while tuition fees ti are
determined at a second stage. The timing is in analogy to Boadway, Marceau and
Marchand (1996) and Kemnitz (2007). Students then allocate to host countries and
either stay on or leave their host country upon graduation. The game is solved
recursively.
6Stage 2 competition: tuition fees When competing over tuition fees, the out-
come of the ﬁrst stage is already known. In principle, two situations have to be con-
sidered: (i) countries have chosen diﬀerent quality levels at the ﬁrst stage (∆q > 0);
(ii) countries have chosen identical quality levels (∆q = 0). The respective outcomes
at the second stage of the game are presented one after another.
Each country i chooses tuition fees ti to maximize rents Ri, taking the other
country’s policy and quality levels (q1,q2), which were already determined at the
ﬁrst stage, as given. The corresponding optimization captures the tradeoﬀ between
the marginal costs and beneﬁts of charging tuition fees, considering the direct rev-
enue eﬀect and the eﬀect on the number of students and therefore also the number
of graduates, who are potential tax payers in the host country. The equilibrium
tuition fees (t∗
1,t∗
2) simultaneously solve t∗
1 = t
br
1 (t∗
2;q1,q2) and t∗
2 = t
br
2 (t∗
1;q1,q2),
where t
br
i (tj;q1,q2) represents country i’s best-response function (please refer to the
Appendix for the derivation):
t
∗
1 =
%[%∆q − pτq1 + α(q2 + 2q1)]
pτ + 3%
− pτw, (7)
t
∗
2 =
%[2%∆q − pτq1 + α(q1 + 2q2)]
pτ + 3%
− pτw. (8)
The tuition-fee diﬀerential
∆t
∗ := t
∗
2 − t
∗
1 =
%[c(q2) − c(q1) + %∆q]
(pτ + 3%)
=
%∆q(α + %)
(pτ + 3%)
> 0, (9)
reﬂects the fact that the high-quality country charges higher tuition fees. First of
all, this is because the country with the higher quality has greater market power,
which allows to charge higher fees, since for given tuition fees, the demand for an
education system increases with its quality. Second, the higher fees in country 2
reﬂect the higher costs per student which are (partially) passed on to students.
The larger α, the more relevant becomes this eﬀect and the larger the tuition-fee
diﬀerential.
The second order conditions for optimal tuition fees in the two countries are
pτq1 − 2%∆q < 0, −pτq2 − 2%∆q < 0. (10)
The equilibrium tuition fees determine the equilibrium allocation of students
ˆ a
∗ := ˆ a(t
∗
1,t
∗
2) =
α + %
pτ + 3%
, (11)
which follows directly from using the tuition-fee diﬀerential (9) in indiﬀerence con-
dition (1).
7If the two countries had chosen identical education qualities q2 = q1 = q at
the ﬁrst stage, they would face ﬁerce tuition-fee competition for the entire pool of
international students. For undiﬀerentiated quality levels, the variable rent (i.e., the
part of the rent depending on the number of foreign students) amounts to
ri|∆q=0 =

   
   
τW + N(ti − c(q)) if ti < tj,
1
2[τW + N(ti − c(q))] if ti = tj,
0 if ti > tj,
where W = pN
R 1
0 (w + aq)da = pN(w + q/2). The ﬁx costs of providing quality
are already sunk and therefore irrelevant for tuition-fee competition. Countries would
have an incentive to undercut their competitor in order to attract all foreign students
as long as ri is still non-negative, thereby engaging in a race-to-the-bottom with
tuition fees t1 = t2 = αq − pτ(w + q/2), ri = 0 and overall rents Ri = −F(q).
Stage 1 competition: education quality At the ﬁrst stage, each country i
decides on quality investments to maximize Ri for given quality investments abroad
and subject to the non-negativity constraint qi ≥ 0. Thereby, countries anticipate
the outcome of tuition-fee competition at the second stage. Given the equilibrium
on stage 2, countries’ objective functions are
Ri(q1,q2) =



ri(q1,q2;t∗
1,t∗
2) − F(qi) if qi 6= qj
−F(qi) if qi = qj, i,j ∈ {1,2}
(12)
where ri(q1,q2;t∗
1,t∗
2) denotes the variable part of country i’s rent from educating
foreign students, given t∗
1 and t∗
2 as of (7) and (8). With q1 = q2, this part of the rent
is zero due to ﬁerce tuition-fee competition.
As can be directly inferred from (12), a situation with undiﬀerentiated education
quality would imply local quality choice q1 = q2 = 0 and would leave both countries
with a zero-rent (R = 0) from educating foreign students.
When choosing quality levels in a scenario with diﬀerentiated education qualities,
decision makers consider not only direct quality eﬀects, but also the consequences of
an increased number of students and therefore graduates on the beneﬁt side as well
as on the cost side (cet. par. higher tax revenue and tuition-fee revenue vs. higher
variable costs of tuition) and the eﬀect on tuition fees t∗
i(qi) that can be charged in
price competition on the subsequent stage of the game. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions
8for the optimal quality level in low-quality country 1 are
∂R1
∂q1
= N1(t
∗
1,t
∗
2)

pτ
2
ˆ a(t
∗
1,t
∗
2) +
∂t∗
1
∂q1
−
∂c
∂q1

−
∂F
∂q1
≤ 0
q1 ≥ 0 and q1
∂R1
∂q1
= 0. (13)
Rent R1 is downward-sloping and convex in q1:
∂R1
∂q1
= −
N
2
(pτ + 2%)ˆ a
∗2 −
∂F
∂q1
< 0 ,
∂2R1
∂q2
1
= −
∂2F
∂q2
1
< 0. (14)
Therefore, q∗
1 = 0 maximizes R1 for 0 ≤ q1 < q2.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimal quality of education in country 2 are
∂R2
∂q2
= N2(t
∗
1,t
∗
2)

pτ
2
[1 + ˆ a(t
∗
1,t
∗
2)] +
∂t∗
2
∂q2
−
∂c
∂q2

−
∂F
∂q2
≤ 0
q2 ≥ 0 and q2
∂R2
∂q2
= 0. (15)
An interior solution for the quality level in country 2 (q∗
2 > q∗
1) is then implicitly
determined by
∂R2
∂q2
=
N
2
(pτ + 2%)(1 − ˆ a
∗)
2 −
∂F
∂q2
= 0. (16)
The second order condition for a maximum holds due to ∂2F/∂q2
2 > 0.
The following Lemma states that the equilibrium of the game is asymmetric.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, host countries of foreign students diﬀerentiate their edu-
cation quality (q∗
1 = 0,q∗
2 > 0) to relax tuition-fee competition. One country (country
2) provides higher education quality and charges higher tuition fees. The high-quality
country attracts the brightest students from the international talent pool.6
Proof. Please refer to the Appendix.
The intuition for this result is in analogy to the rationale for vertical product-
diﬀerentiation in oligopolistic competition, known from the IO-literature (Shaked
and Sutton, 1982, is one of the standard references; Tirole, 1998, ch. 7.5.1, provides
a plain textbook model): ﬁrms diﬀerentiate product qualities in order to relax price
6In principle, there are two asymmetric equilibria: one in which country 2 provides the high
quality education and one in which country 1 provides the higher quality.
9competition.7 Kemnitz (2007) presents a similar result in the context of competition
among autonomous universities.
2.3 Comparative statics
2.3.1 Size of the pool of international students
In the light of the increasing trend of international student mobility (as reported for
example by the OECD, 2008, ch. C3), the question arises how an enlarged pool of
international talents aﬀects the degree of international diﬀerentiation of education
systems. We state the following proposition.
Proposition 1 An increase in the size of the international talent pool raises the
regional diﬀerentiation of higher education.
Proof. Follows directly from (14) and (16).
A marginal quality increase reduces the variable rent in country 1,8 while it raises
the variable rent in country 2. As the marginal rents’ absolute value increases with
the size of the pool of talents, this implies that the degree of quality diﬀerentiation
between both countries increases with N, i.e. ∂∆q∗/∂N > 0. More intuitively, while
7An application of vertical product-diﬀerentiation to public ﬁnance, which is partially com-
parable to the present approach, was recently presented by Zissimos and Wooders (2008). In a
two-country model, they analyze a two-stage Nash competition for ﬁrm settlements by means of
production-cost reducing public-good provision and tax policy. If ﬁrms only diﬀer in technology
but do not have any ex ante country-speciﬁc location preferences, the decentralized equilibrium is
characterized by diﬀerentiated public-good policy and tax policy. An undiﬀerentiated public-good
provision would imply ﬁerce tax competition leaving both countries worse oﬀ. There are further
related contributions in the education literature. In a model with imperfectly mobile households
and capital mobility, Hoyt and Jensen (2001) provide a rationale for two cities to oﬀer diﬀeren-
tiated public-school quality which is ﬁnanced by property-tax revenue: the quality diﬀerentiation
increases individuals’ attachment to their residence and reduces competition between cities, making
both of them better oﬀ. De Fraja and Iossa (2002) analyze the competition of two ex ante identical
universities within a country, which receive a ﬁxed budget by the central government and try to
maximize their institution’s ‘prestige’ by setting student admission standards. Only with low stu-
dent mobility, a symmetric solution will exist. For high student mobility, if there is an equilibrium
at all, it will be asymmetric implying one university becoming an elite institution, setting higher
standards and attracting only the best students.
8The negative marginal rent of an increase in q1 is ﬁnally due to a relatively small latitude to
increase tuition fees in the competitive environment and the lower average abilities of country 1
graduates (implying a lower marginal eﬀect of education quality on the wage sum and therefore
tax revenue in country 1) in comparison with the marginal cost of the quality investment.
10a marginal increase in education quality always produces the same ﬁx costs which
are independent of the number of students, a rising demand implies higher variable
rents for each quality level in country 2, which ﬁnally implies an incentive to raise q2.
As of (9), the increased quality diﬀerentiation goes along with more diﬀerentiated
tuition fees, i.e. ∂∆t∗/∂N > 0.
2.3.2 Stay rate of foreign students
The stay rate of foreign students in their host countries aﬀects the equilibrium
allocation of foreign students, the quality diﬀerentiation between the host countries
and the tuition fee diﬀerential. The following Proposition summarizes.
Proposition 2 An increase in the stay rate of foreign students upon graduation in
the host countries of education
(i) raises the share of foreign students who study in the high-quality country, i.e.
∂(1 − ˆ a∗)/∂p ≥ 0,
(ii) raises the quality diﬀerential, i.e. ∂∆q∗/∂p ≥ 0,
(iii) has an ambiguous eﬀect on the tuition fee diﬀerential:
∂∆t∗
∂p
T 0 ⇔ ∆qp + %p T |ˆ a∗p|,
where ∆qp := (∂∆q/∂p)(p/∆q) > 0, %p := (∂%/∂p)(p/%) ≥ 0 and ˆ a∗p :=
(∂ˆ a∗/∂p)(p/ˆ a∗) ≤ 0.
Proof. Please refer to the Appendix.
The allocation of students With Assumption 1, an increase in stay rate p raises
student’s expected beneﬁt from studying abroad. Therefore, for given ∆t/∆q, the
allocation of students shifts unambiguously towards country 2 (see indiﬀerence con-
dition (1)). This eﬀect largely explains part (i) of the Proposition.
The quality diﬀerential Given the equilibrium derived in the section above (es-
pecially q∗
1 = 0), the eﬀect of a rising p on quality diﬀerentiation ∆q is equivalent to
the eﬀect on q∗
2. The stay rate of foreign students aﬀects both marginal revenues and
marginal costs of providing education quality in high-quality country 2. Overall, how-
ever, ∂q∗
2/∂p ≥ 0 (and therefore ∂∆q∗/∂p ≥ 0). One main driving force is the higher
11total tax revenue which can be generated from a marginal quality investment when
the number of tax payers increases and which provides (ceteris paribus) a higher in-
centive to invest in quality (∂[∂τW ∗
2/∂q2]/∂p] = τN[(1−ˆ a∗2)/2−pˆ a∗(∂ˆ a∗/∂p)] > 0).
The tuition-fee diﬀerential The eﬀect of a rising stay rate p on the tuition-
fee diﬀerential is ambiguous. Given the identity ˆ a∗(p) ≡ 1
%(p)
∆t∗(p)
∆q(p) (see (1)) and
parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2, the intuition for the inequality in part (iii) is
straightforward as an equilibrium result. The inequality does, however, not really
elucidate why countries alter tuition fees in a way that ﬁnally implies a change in the
tuition-fee diﬀerential. As the eﬀect of the stay rate p on actual choices of tuition
fees is quite complex, we make use of some simpliﬁcations to highlight the main
insights.
Suppose τROW = τ and γ = 1, such that % = 1 − τ. The parameter % is then
independent of p (and therefore also %p = 0), i.e. the direct eﬀect of the stay rate
on the allocation of students (1/% is the proportionality constant of the relation
ˆ a ∝ ∆t/∆p as of equation (1)) is eliminated, so that the focus is exclusively on the
stay rate’s eﬀect on equilibrium policies and its indirect eﬀect on student allocation
through a policy change.9 Then, using (9),
∂∆t∗
∂p
   
τROW=τ,γ=1
=
%(α + %)
(pτ + 3%)
∂∆q
∂p
−
%(α + %)
(pτ + 3%)2τ∆q. (17)
The overall eﬀect can be decomposed into two components. First of all, the tuition-
fee diﬀerential (to some extent) goes along with the rising quality diﬀerential, i.e.,
a higher diﬀerentiation of qualities allows for higher diﬀerentiation of tuition fees.
This very intuitive eﬀect is represented by the ﬁrst term in (17).
The second term reﬂects the more direct eﬀects of a change in the stay rate on
the incentives to raise tuition fees in the two regions and thereby also considers the
relevance of income-tax policy. Two eﬀects can be identiﬁed. First, the marginal
cost of raising tuition fees due to deterring students away (in terms of foregone
tax revenue in the future) is higher in the country in which the marginal student
9The auxiliary assumption γ = 1 in this section also implies that a foreign-born graduate from
a university in one of the two developed host countries earns the same labor income when staying
on in the host country and when returning to his (less-developed) home country. This speciﬁcation
can be justiﬁed by recognizing that it is also the relative prize-level (which is usually lower in
less-developed countries) and therefore the real income that ﬁnally matters for the worker’s utility.
Furthermore, Baruch, Budhwar and Khatri (2007) point out that, for example, Chinese and Indian
students with a foreign university degree have excellent career opportunities back in their home
countries, implying a respective living standard.
12earns higher income as a graduate (which is the high-quality country 2). An increase
in the stay rate p implies that the diﬀerence in these marginal costs between the
two countries increases, resulting in a relatively reduced incentive to raise tuition
fees in country 2. The tuition-fee diﬀerential would decrease. The second eﬀect is
directly opposed. An increase in tuition fees in country 2 increases the average
wage-income of foreign-born graduates and therefore average tax-revenues in this
country. The reason is that a marginal increase of t2 only deters away the least
productive students from the group of ROW-students in country 2. The average
income of the remaining students in the future is therefore higher. In country 1,
however, an increase in t1 deters away the students with the highest productivity
within the group of foreign students in this country, so that the average income
of graduates in country 1 decreases. As a rising stay rate of graduates implies an
increase in the relevance of this tax-revenue related aspect within the governments’
objective functions, the incentive to raise tuition fees in the high-quality country
increases, while it decreases in the low-quality country. The tuition-fee diﬀerential
would increase. This last eﬀect via the composition of the student body and therefore
average wage-incomes is a second-order eﬀect compared to the ﬁrst-mentioned eﬀect
through the marginal cost of raising tuition fees. Therefore, the second term in (17)
is ﬁnally negative. The higher the relevance of tax-revenue for local governments,
the more important becomes this eﬀect.
A priori, the overall eﬀect of the stay rate on the tuition-fee diﬀerential is am-
biguous. When the tax-revenue argument becomes suﬃciently strong, the following
interesting scenario could emerge: while an increase in the stay rate of foreign stu-
dents upon graduation raises diﬀerentiation in education quality (∂∆q/∂p > 0),
tuition fees in the two countries actually converge (∂∆t∗/∂p < 0).
2.3.3 Degree of development of the sending region
A basic feature of the present analysis is the asymmetry of host countries and send-
ing countries of foreign students. While host countries are developed countries, ROW
is a less developed region. This section brieﬂy considers the ROW reaching a higher
degree of development and therefore catching up with the developed countries. Ana-
lytically, we can analyze the eﬀect of a marginal increase in γ, implying a narrowing
wage gap between ROW and the developed countries. The following Proposition
summarizes.
13Proposition 3 An increase in the degree of development of the sending region
of foreign students raises the host countries’ diﬀerentiation of education quality
(∂∆q∗/∂γ > 0). The eﬀect on the allocation of students and tuition fees is am-
biguous.
Proof. Please refer to the Appendix.
Ceteris paribus, the degree of development of the sending region raises a student’s
expected return to education abroad. For given tuition fees and quality levels in the
host countries (more precisely, for given ∆t/∆q), this increase in returns implies
an increase in the share of students who decide to study in high-quality country
2 (see equation (1)). In other words, country 2 enhances market power relative to
low-quality country 1. For some given allocation of students, a marginal increase
in education quality q2 then implies increased latitude to raise tuition fees at the
price-competition stage.10 Ceteris paribus, country 2 has an incentive to increase
quality. This eﬀect largely explains the increased regional quality diﬀerentiation if
the degree of development of the sending region increases.
The increase in the quality diﬀerential is likely to go along with a rising tuition fee
diﬀerential. A suﬃcient condition is that the number of students in the high-quality
country increases in equilibrium, as can be seen from the proof of Proposition 3.
3 Welfare considerations
This section analyzes whether the outcome of competitive/decentralized education
policy deviates from a welfare maximum. An allocation of students and the quality
levels in the two host countries are supposed to be ﬁrst best if the talent pool’s
aggregate gross income net of education costs is maximized. Graduates earn wage
income either in the host countries of education or in the home region ROW. The
aggregate welfare function then is
W
◦ = N[p + (1 − p)γ]
Z ˆ a◦
0
(w + aq
◦
1)da +
Z 1
ˆ a◦
(w + aq
◦
2)da

− Nα[q
◦
2 − ˆ a
◦(q
◦
2 − q
◦
1)] −
X
i∈{1,2}
F(q
◦
i), (18)
10This can bee see from (8):

∂
∂γ

∂t∗
2
∂q2
 
 
dˆ a∗=0
= 2ˆ a∗(1 − p)(1 − τROW) ≥ 0.
14where the ﬁrst line is aggregate gross income and the second line comprises variable
and ﬁxed costs of providing eduction quality in the two host countries.
The ﬁrst order condition for an interior/boundary solution of ˆ a◦ is
∂W ◦
∂ˆ a◦ = N{α − [p + (1 − p)γ]ˆ a
◦}(q
◦
2 − q
◦
1) = 0, (19)
such that the ﬁrst best allocation of students is characterized by
ˆ a
◦ =
α
p + (1 − p)γ
. (20)
If there are no variable costs of providing education quality (i.e., α = 0), the ﬁrst
best is characterized by an allocation of the entire pool of international students
to the high-quality country 2 (boundary solution ˆ a◦ = 0). The reason is that wage
incomes increase with quality, which is higher in country 2. Allocating students to
region 1 would therefore reduce welfare. With strictly positive variable costs (i.e.,
α > 0), however, allocating some students to country 1 becomes worthwhile, because
a lower quality also implies lower costs per student.11 The interior solution as of (20)
balances both eﬀects at the margin.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for education qualities q◦
1 and q◦
2 are
∂W ◦
∂q◦
1
= Nˆ a
◦

[p + (1 − p)γ]
ˆ a◦
2
− α

−
∂F
∂q◦
1
≤ 0
q
◦
1 ≥ 0 and q
◦
1
∂W ◦
∂q◦
1
= 0, (21)
∂W ◦
∂q◦
2
= N(1 − ˆ a
◦)

[p + (1 − p)γ]
1 + ˆ a◦
2
− α

−
∂F
∂q◦
2
≤ 0
q
◦
2 ≥ 0 and q
◦
2
∂W ◦
∂q◦
2
= 0. (22)
Using (20) in (21) and (22) yields ﬁrst best quality levels: q◦
1 = 0 and q◦
2 > 0
which is implicitly determined by
N
2
[p + (1 − p)γ](1 − ˆ a
◦)
2 −
∂F
∂q◦
2
= 0. (23)
With (20), the Hessian matrix of W ◦ = W(ˆ a◦,q◦
1,q◦
2) is negative-deﬁnite, i.e. the
solution actually maximizes aggregate welfare.
11As can bee seen from (18) and
R ˆ a
◦
0 (w+aq◦
1)da+
R 1
ˆ a◦(w+aq◦
2)da = w+q◦
2/2−ˆ a◦2(q◦
2−q◦
1)/2, the
welfare loss of allocating students to country 1 if α = 0, is captured by N[p+(1−p)γ]ˆ a◦2(q◦
2−q◦
1)/2.
The cost saving of allocating students to country 1 if α > 0, is captured by Nαˆ a◦(q◦
2 − q◦
1).
15The equilibrium allocation of students and the diﬀerentiation of education qual-
ities in the competition for the international pool of talents as of Section 2.2 are
likely to deviate from the ﬁrst best.
Proposition 4 Comparing the equilibrium of the competition for the international
pool of talents to the ﬁrst best, one can distinguish two cases:
(i) If pτ + 2% > p + (1 − p)γ,
(a) (1 − ˆ a∗) T (1 − ˆ a◦) ⇔ α T
%[p+(1−p)γ]
pτ+3%−[p+(1−p)γ],
(b) (1 − ˆ a∗) ≥ (1 − ˆ a◦) involves q∗
2 > q◦
2 (∆q∗ > ∆q◦),
(c) (1 − ˆ a∗) < (1 − ˆ a◦) can in principle involve q∗
2 ≥ q◦
2 (∆q∗ ≥ ∆q◦) as well
as q∗
2 < q◦
2 (∆q∗ < ∆q◦). If ∃˜ α ∈ [0,
%[p+(1−p)γ]
pτ+3%−[p+(1−p)γ][ such that q∗
2 = q◦
2,
q
◦
2 T q
∗
2 (∆q
◦ T ∆q
∗) ⇔ α S ˜ α.
(ii) If pτ + 2% ≤ p + (1 − p)γ,
(a) (1 − ˆ a∗)  (1 − ˆ a◦),
(b) (1 − ˆ a◦) > (1 − ˆ a∗) involves q◦
2 > q∗
2 (∆q◦ > ∆q∗).
Proof. Please refer to the Appendix
The allocation of students in the decentralized equilibrium can in principle devi-
ate from the welfare maximizing allocation in both directions (part (i)-(a) of Propo-
sition 4). The variable costs of providing education quality plays an important role
here. If there are no variable costs of educating students (α = 0), the number of
students in high-quality country 2 in the decentralized equilibrium falls short of the
ﬁrst best level. The welfare maximum would require an allocation of all students
to the high-quality country. In the decentralized solution, however, there is also
demand for low-quality country 1. Quality diﬀerentiation implies imperfect compe-
tition and some market power for host countries, which allows country 1 to attract
some students from abroad, although this is actually ineﬃcient. With a rising α, i.e.
with rising marginal variable costs of providing education quality, the allocation of
students shifts towards the low-quality country both in the decentralized and the
ﬁrst best solution. The fall in demand for high-quality country 2 is larger in the ﬁrst
best, however, than in the decentralized equilibrium, such that for high enough an
α (i.e., α >
%[p+(1−p)γ]
pτ+3%−[p+(1−p)γ]) the number of students in the high-quality country is
larger in the decentralized solution than in the ﬁrst best.
16While the equilibrium education quality in country 1 is welfare maximizing (i.e.,
q∗
1 = q◦
1 = 0), education quality in country 2 (and therefore also the quality diﬀeren-
tial ∆q) is likely to deviate from the ﬁrst best. Case (i) in Proposition 4 includes all
cases in which for given and identical allocations of students in the decentralized so-
lution and the ﬁrst best (i.e., ˆ a∗ = ˆ a◦), the marginal beneﬁt of investing in education
quality is higher from the rent-maximizing perspective of country 2 in the competi-
tive setting than from the welfare maximizing perspective (see (16) and (23)). While
country 2 in the decentralized setting considers the eﬀect of education quality on
the local tax base and tuition-fee revenue, the aggregate welfare-maximizing solution
considers the eﬀect of education quality on aggregate income. With more students
studying in country 2 in the decentralized solution compared to the ﬁrst best, quality
level q∗
2 unambiguously exceeds ﬁrst best level q◦
2 (part (i)-(b) of Proposition 4). In
other words, the competition for the pool of talents wastes resources compared to
aggregate welfare. With the number of country-2 students in the decentralized equi-
librium falling short of the ﬁrst best, q∗
2 can either be smaller, larger or equal to the
welfare maximizing level. The higher the variable cost-parameter α, the smaller the
number of country-2 students in the ﬁrst best relative to the decentralized setting
(i.e., the smaller the ratio (1−ˆ a◦)/(1−ˆ a∗)) and the more likely the competition for
the pool of talents implies local underinvestment in education quality (q∗
2 < q◦
2).
Part (ii) of Proposition 4 deals with the case where, for given and identical alloca-
tions of students in the decentralized solution and the ﬁrst best, the marginal beneﬁt
of investing in education quality is smaller from the rent-maximizing perspective of
country 2 in the competitive setting than from the welfare maximizing perspec-
tive. This scenario is only consistent with a larger number of country-2 students in
the ﬁrst best compared to the decentralized equilibrium (part (ii)-(a)). Competition
for the pool of talents then implies an underinvestment in education quality (part
(ii)-(b)).
4 Some implications for sending countries
The positive eﬀect of the size of the pool of talents on quality diﬀerentiation (2.3.1)
has an implication for the brain-drain/brain-gain discussion, which usually takes the
perspective of a less-developed source region (ROW in our case) and analyzes the
consequences of (high-skilled) emigration. Especially if domestic education prospects
are rather poor, ROW probably has a vital interest in obtaining the high(er) skills
17of native students who have been trained in a developed country.12 Then, for a given
stay rate p, the share of high-skilled graduates in ROW who have been educated
abroad increases with N (the share of return migrants within the ROW workforce
is ψ := (1 − p)N/(N − pN), where N > N is the total number of ROW-born
individuals; dψ/dN = (1−p)N/(N −pN)2 > 0). This increase is what we might call
a quantitative brain-gain eﬀect. In addition, an increase in N alters the competition
of the host countries of ROW-born foreign students: country 2 now oﬀers higher
education quality q2, while education quality in country 1 remains unchanged (q1 =
0); the allocation of students to the host regions remains unchanged too, because
it is independent of both N and ∆q (see (11)). Therefore, return migrants from
the high-quality country 2 are more productive now, implying what we might call a
qualitative brain-gain eﬀect.
A qualitative brain-gain eﬀect also plays an important role when looking at the
stay rate of foreign students in their host countries. First of all, an increase in
the stay rate p reduces the share of internationally educated graduates in ROW
(dψ/dp = N(N − N)/(N − pN)2 < 0), which can be called a quantitative brain
drain. At the same time, an increase in p alters competition between host countries
of foreign students (2.3.2). As a result, the allocation of ROW-born students to host
countries changes: the share of the pool of talents being educated in the high-quality
country 2 increases (d(1 − ˆ a∗)/dp > 0). In addition, education quality in country
2 increases, while q1 = 0 remains unchanged. Therefore, with a rising stay rate of
foreign students in the host regions, ROW suﬀers from a quantitative brain drain
eﬀect, but beneﬁts from a qualitative brain gain eﬀect in terms of (i) a larger share
of return migrants who have been educated in the high-quality country 2, and (ii) a
better education (and therefore higher productivity) of graduates who return from
the high-quality country. As the focus of the present paper is on host countries of
foreign students and not on sending regions, we do not carry on this brain-gain
idea in more detail. Haupt, Krieger and Lange (2010) take on the basic idea and
show that the qualitative brain-gain eﬀect can cause both aggregate and per-capita
human capital to increase in the sending country of foreign students, as long as the
stay rate of students in the host country of education is not too large.
12The idea here is that human capital not only has a quantitative but also a qualitative compo-
nent. The endogenous-growth theory identiﬁes skilled human capital as a crucial determinant of
economic growth (e.g., Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990).
185 Conclusion
The present paper starts from the observation that a relatively small number of
top-destinations for international students hosts a considerable share of students
from countries like China and India going for higher education in one of the western
developed countries. The model reduces this observation to the competition of two
developed countries for the international pool of talents from a third region (ROW).
There are good reasons for host countries to attract those students by means of their
education system. Especially the prospect of thereby attracting future high-skilled
workers if some of the international students stay on in their host countries deserves
special attention. The equilibrium in our model is characterized by diﬀerentiated ed-
ucation policy in the sense of one country oﬀering a high-quality-high-price education
for the most talented students, while the other country charges lower tuition fees for
a low(er)-quality education, attracting less talented students. The regional diﬀeren-
tiation is actually the result of competition and not due to an ex ante asymmetry
of countries: countries relax tuition-fee competition through quality diﬀerentiation.
The diﬀerentiation of education quality between host countries increases with the
size of the international talent pool, with the stay rate of foreign students in the
host countries upon graduation and with the degree of development of the sending
region of foreign students.
The results have some implication for the ongoing brain-drain/brain-gain dis-
cussion. While an increase in the stay rate of students in the host countries implies
a quantitative brain drain from the (poor) source countries’ perspective, the in-
duced increase in the equilibrium quality-diﬀerentiation between host countries and
a shift of the student allocation towards the high-quality country ﬁnally contrasts
the quantitative brain-drain eﬀect with a qualitative brain-gain eﬀect through return
migrants. Depending on whether the brain-drain or brain-gain eﬀect dominates, the
source regions of the international talent pool will either loose or gain from a reduced
return rate of their human capital trained in the western world. So far, the recent
literature on a ‘beneﬁcial brain drain’ has mainly emphasized the role of additional
incentives to acquire skills in a less-developed country when there is an option to
migrate to a developed country upon graduation in order to earn higher wages (e.g.,
Mountford, 1997; Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz, 1997, 1998; Vidal, 1998; Beine,
Docquier and Rapoport, 2001, 2008; Stark and Wang, 2002; Mayr and Peri, 2009;
Eggert, Krieger and Meier, 2010).
Furthermore, we argued that the allocation of students to the two host countries
as well as the degree of regional quality diﬀerentiation are likely to deviate from the
19aggregate welfare-maximizing solution.
We should mention that the assumption of perfect student mobility might not
hold in reality. If students in the international pool of talents had some country-
speciﬁc preferences implying imperfect mobility, competition would be less ﬁerce
and the quality diﬀerentiation might be less extreme. However, compared to a two-
country setting in which each country tries to attract students from the other coun-
try, students from a third country (developing country), as in our model, going
for education in Europe, North America or Australia, should have much weaker
country-speciﬁc preferences in location choice. Pure two-country models with stu-
dent migration usually feature imperfect student mobility (e.g., Boadway, Marceau
and Marchand, 1996; Buettner and Schwager, 2004; G´ erard, 2007; Lange, 2009;
Krieger and Lange, 2010).
The analysis points to some issues for future research. While we have assumed si-
multaneous moves, for example, there could also be sequential choice of quality levels
or rather entrance in the competition for international students (e.g., by launching
international study programs). Countries then have an incentive to spend resources
to lead the way and obtain a ﬁrst-mover advantage by choosing the more proﬁtable
quality level. Furthermore, it would be worthwhile considering an endogenous im-
migration policy which targets the stay rates of graduates. Countries could try to
support the success of social integration and exert some eﬀort to facilitate gradu-
ates’ labor-market access (e.g., by promoting permanent residency). More and more
OECD countries already make use of this option and it could be interesting to
elaborate more on the strategic aspects of immigration policy in the context of the
competition for the international pool of talents. Including admission standards to
the choice set of countries, like for example in De Fraja and Iossa (2002), may also
enrich further research.
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Tuition-fee competition (Section 2.2)
Country 1 chooses t1 to maximize R1, taking t2 and quality levels (q1,q2) as given.
The corresponding ﬁrst order condition for given ∆q > 0 is
t1

pτq1
%∆q
− 2

− t2

pτq1
%∆q
− 1

− pτw + c(q1) = 0,
from which one can directly derive the best-response function t1 = t
br
1 (t2;q1,q2):
t1 = θ1t2 +
pτw − c(q1)
pτq1
%∆q − 2
; θ1 :=
pτq1
%∆q − 1
pτq1
%∆q − 2
. (24)
The ﬁrst order condition for tuition fees chosen by country 2 and the best-response
function t2 = t
br
2 (t1;q1,q2) can analogously be determined as
t1

pτq2
%∆q
+ 1

− t2

pτq2
%∆q
+ 2

− pτw + c(q2) + %∆q = 0
and
t2 = θ2t1 +
%∆q + c(q2) − pτw
pτq2
%∆q + 2
; θ2 :=
pτq2
%∆q + 1
pτq2
%∆q + 2
. (25)
Combining (24) and (25) yields equilibrium tuition fees
t
∗
1 =
1
1 − θ1θ2
"
pτw − c(q1)
pτq1
%∆q − 2
+ θ1
%∆q + c(q2) − pτw
pτq2
%∆q + 2
#
,
t
∗
2 =
1
1 − θ1θ2
"
θ2
pτw − c(q1)
pτq1
%∆q − 2
+
%∆q + c(q2) − pτw
pτq2
%∆q + 2
#
,
which ﬁnally can be reduced to (7) and (8).
Proof Lemma 1
With undiﬀerentiated education quality, both countries were demonstrated to gener-
ate a zero-rent from educating the international pool of talents (i.e., R1 = R2 = 0).
The fact that both countries can earn strictly positive rents (R1,R2 > 0) with dif-
ferentiated qualities ﬁnally proves the Lemma.
To this end, we ﬁrst of all prove that variable rents are strictly positive for an
interior solution of the allocation of foreign students ˆ a∗, i.e. we prove that ri(q1,q2) ≡
21τWi + Ni[ti − c(qi)] > 0, i ∈ {1,2}. Variable rents are
r1(q1,q2) = Nˆ a
∗
npτ
2
ˆ a
∗q1 + t
∗
1 − αq1
o
,
r2(q1,q2) = N(1 − ˆ a
∗)
npτ
2
(1 + ˆ a
∗)q2 + t
∗
2 − αq2
o
.
Using equilibrium values t∗
1, t∗
2 and ˆ a∗ as of (7), (8) and (11), and for strictly positive
demand for both education systems (i.e., 0 < ˆ a∗ < 1), we ﬁnd
r1(q1,q2) > 0 if pτq1 − 2%∆q < 0,
r2(q1,q2) > 0 if
pτ
2
q2 + %∆q

(pτ + 2% − α) > 0.
While the second order condition for the optimal t∗
1 guarantees r1(q1,q2) > 0, the
strictly positive demand for education in country 2 (see that (1 − ˆ a∗) = (pτ +
2%−α)/(pτ +3%)) ensures r2(q1,q2) > 0. With undiﬀerentiated education quality, a
race-to-the-bottom in tuition fees would drive this rent down to zero.
With q∗
1 = 0 and r1(q1,q2) > 0, as can be seen from (12), country 1 generates
a strictly positive rent R1 > 0 from educating foreign students . The reason is that
country 1 does not incur any costs from educating foreign students but nevertheless
generates some (tax/tuition-fee) revenue from those students who cannot aﬀord to
study in country 2.
Country 2 also generates a strictly positive rent R2. As lim
q2→0R(q2) = 0,
q
∗
2 = argmaxR2(q2) > 0 ⇔ R2 > 0.
The equilibrium allocation of students is ˆ a∗. As of (1), all individuals with ability
a ≥ ˆ a∗ study in the high-quality country 2, while all students with a < ˆ a∗ study in
country 1.
Proof Proposition 2
First of all,
∂%(p)
∂p
= (1 − τ) − (1 − τROW)γ ≥ 0
can be signed unambiguously by Assumption 1. Furthermore,
∂ˆ a∗
∂p
= −
τ[(1 − τROW)γ + α] + 3α
∂%
∂p
(pτ + 3%)2 ≤ 0
and therefore ∂(1 − ˆ a∗)/∂p ≥ 0, which proves part (i) of the proposition.
22Part (ii) follows from
∂∆q∗
∂p
T 0
(q∗
1=0)
⇔
∂q∗
2
∂p
T 0
(16)
⇔
∂
∂p

N
2
(pτ + 2%)(1 − ˆ a
∗)
2

T 0
and
∂
∂p

N
2
(pτ + 2%)(1 − ˆ a
∗)
2

=
N(1 − ˆ a∗)
2

(τ + 2
∂%
∂p
)(1 − ˆ a
∗) − 2(pτ + 2%)
∂ˆ a∗
∂p

≥ 0.
Considering the tuition-fee diﬀerential (9) and the equilibrium allocation of stu-
dents (11),
∂∆t∗
∂p
=
∂[%(p)∆q(p)ˆ a∗(p)]
∂p
T 0
⇔ %ˆ a
∗∂∆q
∂p
+ ∆q

∂%
∂p
ˆ a
∗ + %
∂ˆ a∗
∂p

T 0
⇔
∂∆q
∂p
p
∆q
+
∂%
∂p
p
%
+
∂ˆ a∗
∂p
p
ˆ a∗ T 0,
which proves part (iii) of the proposition.
Proof Proposition 3
The ﬁrst part follows from
∂∆q∗
∂γ
T 0
(q∗
1=0)
⇔
∂q∗
2
∂γ
T 0
(16)
⇔
∂
∂γ

N
2
(pτ + 2%)(1 − ˆ a
∗)
2

T 0 (26)
and
∂
∂γ

N
2
(pτ + 2%)(1 − ˆ a
∗)
2

> 0 ⇔ 3%pτ + 6%
2 + 2αpτ + 3α% > 0,
which always holds. Second, with ∂%/∂γ > 0 ∀τROW,p ∈ [0,1[,
∂(1 − ˆ a∗)
∂γ
T 0 ⇔
3α − pτ
(pτ + 3%)2 T 0.
Third,
∂∆t∗
∂γ
T 0 ⇔ ∆qγ + %γ + ˆ a∗γ T 0,
where ∆qγ := (∂∆q/∂γ)(γ/∆q) > 0, %γ := (∂%/∂γ)(γ/%) ≥ 0 and ˆ a∗γ :=
(∂ˆ a∗/∂γ)(γ/ˆ a∗) T 0.
23Proof Proposition 4
Part (i)-(a) of the Proposition follows from comparing (11) and (20).
Comparing (16) and (23),
q
◦
2 T q
∗
2 ⇔
1 − ˆ a◦
1 − ˆ a∗ T
s
pτ + 2%
p + (1 − p)γ
. (27)
Part (i)-(b) follows immediately.
Part (i)-(c) takes on (27) and uses the fact that (1 − ˆ a◦)/(1 − ˆ a∗) decreases
monotonically in α if pτ + 2% > p + (1 − p)γ:
∂
∂α

1 − ˆ a◦
1 − ˆ a∗

=
pτ + 3%
[p + (1 − p)γ](pτ + 2% − α)

p + (1 − p)γ − α
pτ + 2% − α
− 1

< 0
⇔ p + (1 − p)γ − pτ − 2% < 0.
Therefore, if there exists an ˜ α ∈]0,
%[p+(1−p)γ]
pτ+3%−[p+(1−p)γ][ for which q◦
2 = q∗
2(⇔ 1−ˆ a◦
1−ˆ a∗ =
q
pτ+2%
p+(1−p)γ), it follows that
q
◦
2 T q
∗
2 ⇔ α S ˜ α.
Simplifying the analysis for example by assuming τ = τROW, using (27) one ﬁnds
that q◦
2 > q∗
2 if α = 0. Then, with part (i)-(b) and (1− ˆ a◦)/(1− ˆ a∗) decreasing in α,
there will always exist a unique ˜ α ∈]0,
%[p+(1−p)γ]
pτ+3%−[p+(1−p)γ][.
Part (ii)-(a) follows from the fact that pτ + 2% > p + (1 − p)γ is a necessary
condition for (1 − ˆ a∗) ≥ (1 − ˆ a◦) if % 6= 0: with pτ + 3% > p + (1 − p)γ (which is a
necessary condition for ˆ a◦ ≥ ˆ a∗), (1 − ˆ a∗)  (1 − ˆ a◦) if pτ + 2% < p + (1 − p)γ.
Part (ii)-(b) ﬁnally follows immediately from (27).
See that q◦
2 T q∗
2 always implies ∆q◦ T ∆q∗, as q∗
1 = q◦
1 = 0.
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